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This article studies alterations in the values, attitudes, and behaviors that emerged5
among U.S. citizens as a consequence of, and as a response to, the attacks of September
11, 2001. The study briefly examines the immediate reaction to the attack, before fo-
cusing on the collective reactions that characterized the behavior of the majority of the
population between the events of 9/11 and the response to it in the form of intervention
in Afghanistan. In studying this period an eight-phase sequential model (Botcharova,10
2001) is used, where the initial phases center on the nation as the ingroup and the latter
focus on the enemy who carried out the attack as the outgroup.
The study is conducted from a psychosocial perspective and uses “social identity
theory” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) as the basic framework for interpreting and
accounting for the collective reactions recorded. The main purpose of this paper is to15
show that the interpretation of these collective reactions is consistent with the postulates
of social identity theory. The application of this theory provides a different and specific
analysis of events. The study is based on data obtained from a variety of rigorous
academic studies and opinion polls conducted in relation to the events of 9/11.
In line with social identity theory, 9/11 had a marked impact on the importance20
attached by the majority of U.S. citizens to their identity as members of a nation. This in
turn accentuated group differentiation and activated ingroup favoritism and outgroup
discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Ingroup favoritism strengthened group
cohesion, feelings of solidarity, and identification with the most emblematic values of
the U.S. nation, while outgroup discrimination induced U.S. citizens to conceive the25
enemy (al-Qaeda and its protectors) as the incarnation of evil, depersonalizing the
group and venting their anger on it, and to give their backing to a military response,
the eventual intervention in Afghanistan. Finally, and also in line with the postulates of
social identity theory, as an alternative to the virtual bipolarization of the conflict (U.S.
vs al-Qaeda), the activation of a higher level of identity in the ingroup is proposed, a30
group that includes the United States and the largest possible number of countries—
including Islamic states—in the search for a common, more legitimate and effective
solution.
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The terrorist attack of 9/11 in the United States was an exceptional event because of35
its dimension, its characteristics, its impact, and its political and social repercussions.
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Consequently, the study of the attack has acquired great significance in a wide range of dis-
ciplines. This article studies the reaction of the U.S. population to the disaster of 9/11 from a
psychosocial perspective.
The characteristics of 9/11, in particular the unprecedented scale of the attack, planned 40
from abroad and aimed at internal and emblematic targets in the United States, caused
extraordinary commotion and gave rise to the need for a new definition of the situation.
The authorities and the mass media immediately took leading roles in influencing the social
construction of this phenomenon, in order to help shape the citizens’ perception of events.
These agents of influence were of great importance in establishing the new vision of the 45
social reality that was largely shared by the U.S. population after 9/11. It should be stressed
that this study refers at all times to the reactions of citizens based solely on their perception
of the facts. It would be interesting to examine more exhaustively the importance of these
agents of influence—above all the mass media, but also those working in politics, business
and other fields—in the construction of these perceptions, but this goes beyond the scope 50
of this paper.
The terrorist attack led many U.S. citizens to reconsider, at least temporarily, certain
values and attitudes, and some even altered some of their daily behavior, as will be presented
later. It is in this broad sense that the article examines collective reactions or processes. In
using the expressions collective processes or reactions generically, the paper alludes to the 55
processes or reactions of the majority of the population, not to those of all U.S. citizens;
this means that other types of reactions of a minority nature are not presented here.
This paper seeks to study the citizens’ collective reaction from the moment in which
the attack took place, to identify the principal or predominant tendencies in interpreting
the attack, to see how certain attitudes and behaviors were modified, and to see how the 60
citizens’ response to 9/11 was shaped in the weeks that followed, until the government took
the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. Specifically, the main aim of this paper is to show
the extent to which this collective reaction to 9/11 can be interpreted as being consistent
with the postulates of “social identity theory” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). A people’s
social identity as a nation acquires greater importance when that nation is attacked from the 65
outside. Starting from this basic premise of “social identity theory,” a general explanation
of the collective processes that emerged in response to the 9/11 attacks is undertaken here.
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) holds that because individuals feel
they belong to a certain social group or category, they tend to highlight the characteristics
that differentiate them from the members of other groups and, at the same time, they seek to 70
create a positive image of their own. This group differentiation is the result of two factors.
First, social categorization (Tajfel, 1978) increases the differences with respect to members
of other categories while increasing the similarities with respect to those of one’s own group.
Second, social comparison means that a distinctive, yet positive, image is sought for the
in-group. Insofar as individuals identify with a group, the sense of belonging to this group 75
will guide their behavior. This sense of belonging leads them to experience an ingroup
bias by which individuals will tend to favor their own group—ingroup favoritism—and to
discriminate against other groups—outgroup discrimination.
Human behavior is typically driven by one’s personal identity rather than by one’s
social identity or awareness of belonging to a group. In order for behavior to be guided by 80
social identity, the latter must come to the fore; that is, it must be previously activated. The
activation of social identity occurs in many different contexts, but especially in situations
of conflict and rivalry, as studies conducted in a variety of contexts have repeatedly demon-
strated. The classic study entitled the “Robbers Cave” (Sherif & Sherif, 1953) showed that
intergroup conflict can intensify identification with the group (corroboration of this finding 85
is to be found, for example, in Ryen & Kahn, 1975 and Price, 1989). Likewise, it might
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be concluded that 9/11 led to an intensification of the social identity of the group-country
being attacked, as this paper seeks to demonstrate below. Among the characteristics of
9/11 that might have brought about this intensification of identity, the following should be
highlighted: the fact that the aggression originated from outside the country, the fact that90
important symbols of the identity of the most powerful country in the world were attacked,
the fact that nearly three thousand people were killed in the space of just a few minutes,
and the fact that the events occurred in such a shocking way, broadcast live through the
media.
Sequential Analysis of the Collective Reactions After 9/1195
Below, the most salient values, attitudes, and behaviors manifest by the majority of the U.S.
population between the 9/11 attack and the response to it in the form of the intervention
in Afghanistan are examined. Most of the empirical data used in this study are taken from
academic research conducted on the events of 9/11 and, in some cases, from opinion polls
undertaken by prestigious entities, which in virtually all cases provide data that allow100
the situations before and after 9/11 to be compared. All these data have been used with
prudence and caution, seeking confirmation in the results of several polls, in an awareness
that certain inaccuracies and methodological limitations can be present in such polls, for
example, certain biases in the formulation of questions or a failure to filter the sensitivity
to social desirability from the responses. However, the relations that are shown among the105
data presented do not allow cause–effect relations to be established. Equally, the results of
separate polls that ask different questions do not allow one to conclude that the same person
experienced each of the separate components.
In order to conduct a more detailed study of the collective reactions a model is used
as a guide. This model divides the sequence for analysis into eight phases. Specifically, it110
involves an adaptation of the cycle of violence model proposed by Botcharova (2001), which
identifies the phases that lead to a violent act of revenge in a situation of conflict. These eight
phases should be understood without any strictly defined chronology, since various aspects
can occur, and indeed do occur, simultaneously. Only the first and last phases correspond
strictly to the origin and end of the process.115
Before studying each phase separately, a description of the whole model is provided. Q2
An overall analysis of these eight stages shows that the first four focus their attention
primarily on the ingroup, while the last four focus on the outgroup. A major similarity can
be seen between the first four and the last four stages. In both cases the emphasis is placed
on the same four components, albeit in a different order. The components are behavioral,120
emotional, cognitive, and cultural in nature (see Table 1).
Stage 1. Aggression/Act of Violence
The attacks of 9/11 mark the beginning of the cycle. From the first moment, and primarily
as a result of information provided by the television networks, U.S. citizens were fully
informed of the severity of the terrorist attack. Furthermore, given the scale of the attack125
and the symbolic importance of the targets chosen, it was clear that the attack had been
aimed not at a specific institution, entity, or government, but rather at a whole country,
and most U.S. citizens perceived it also as a direct attack on them (Schuster et al., 2001).
The targets are among the most representative of the country’s identity. These percep-
tions indicate that the social identity of the majority of those who consider themselves130
to be members of this country has been attacked. The aggression reveals the intensity of
the conflict and, as predicted by social identity theory, it activates the social identity of
the aggrieved party (Ryen & Kahn, 1975; Price, 1989). This activated social identity now Q3
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TABLE 1
Greatest Component
focus of receiving
Stages attention greatest emphasis
1. Aggression/act of violence Ingroup Behavioral
2. Injury, pain, shock Ingroup Emotional
3. Realization of loss Ingroup Cognitive
4. Suppression of grief and the seeking of refuge
in values
Ingroup Cultural
5. Feelings of anger Outgroup Emotional
6. Desire for justice and the seeking of revenge Outgroup Cognitive
7. Telling and retelling the “right” conflict history Outgroup Cultural
8. An act of “justified” aggression Outgroup Behavioral
Adapted from Botcharova (2001).
has the capacity to guide the behavior of the group members, since this activation means
that people tend to behave more as members of a group than as independent individuals. 135
Next the reaction of those affected in the place of the terrorist acts immediately after the
attacks are briefly analyzed. This analysis is based on the images and testimonies offered
in the mass media. From these data, it would appear that the scenes of panic described in
the classic literature on catastrophes were relatively few. Panic reactions are the result of a
complex chain of interactions when facing a situation perceived as constituting an imminent 140
threat to one’s life, but in general such reactions are rare, and cooperative, coordinated
behavior is predominant (Johnson, 1987). In this case, the main reason why panic did
not ensue might have been because most people did not have a clear or direct perception
of the risk their lives were under—the possibility of escape predominated over that of
being trapped. Perhaps because they were unaware that the towers were about to collapse, 145
most of the people evacuated the buildings and dispersed in relative calm through the
neighboring streets. In this situation of great tension, certain behaviors seem to have emerged
spontaneously and these ensured that the escape was relatively orderly. The work of the fire
services was also instrumental in this.
The behavior seen on 9/11 was not that predicted by the theories of irrational contagion, 150
but rather was more consistent with Turner and Killian’s emerging norm theory (Turner &
Killian, 1987), which indicates how, in an unstructured situation, new behavior patterns may
evolve that establish a new definition of the situation and are followed and thus legitimized
by others. Indeed, in a study published in 1998, Aguirre Wenger, and Vigo used this theory
to explain the initial reaction and subsequent evacuation of the WTC after a terrorist car- 155
bomb attack in 1993. However, the theory that perhaps best explains these events is that of
social identity, and more specifically Reicher’s (1987) application of this theory to explain
crowd behavior during an emergency. Reicher explains that in such a situation, exemplified
here by the evacuation of the Twin Towers, the group of people who find themselves caught
up in the emergency construct a situational identity, on becoming aware that they share a 160
problem that can only be faced by proposing a collective solution. This solution will be
consistent with the group’s cultural values, beliefs and rules—rules of civic behavior that
have been internalized in the socialization process (for example, “the evacuation should be
conducted in an orderly fashion”).
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Stage 2. Injury, Pain, Shock165
This phase alludes to the initial impact, the great damage caused, and the pain and grief
of the survivors and of those who expressed solidarity with them. A number of studies
provide data on the extent of the psychological damage inflicted by the attacks. A study
conducted among the adult population of Manhattan between five and eight weeks after
9/11 (Galea et al., 2002) found that incidences of depression and post-traumatic stress had170
practically doubled; cases of depression had risen from 4.9 to 9.7%, and those of PTSD from Q4
3.6 to 7.5%. PTSD reached 20% among the population living closest to the World Trade
Center.
A further study conducted in the first week after 9/11 (Schuster et al., 2001) found
high levels of stress among adults throughout the United States, showing that those who did175
not actually experience the attack first-hand also presented symptoms of stress, especially
those who considered themselves close to the victims. This was in fact in the case of most
U.S. citizens, who in general regarded the attack as an aggression against their nation and
against them as individuals. In fact, according to this study, 90% of the adult population
showed some degree of stress attributable to 9/11; specifically, they “experienced at least one180
symptom ‘a little bit’,” and 44% presented “at least one of five substantial stress symptoms”
(these high percentages correspond to a sample of 560 adults interviewed between the third
and fifth days after the attack).
In line with social identity theory (Turner, 1987, 102–103), the activation of a group’s Q5
social identity—in this case, that of the U.S. people—implies the activation of its internal185
cohesion, giving rise, among other things, to a perception of common interests, cooperation,
and demonstrations of empathic altruism towards members of the ingroup. The members
of the group change their hierarchy of interests, giving priority to group interests over those
of the individual. The results of the studies mentioned above in this section support the
activation of ingroup empathy and show how this empathy, expressed through the suffering190
experienced by the citizens, appears to be directly related to their proximity to the victims of
the attack. Greater suffering occurred (i.e., a higher number of citizens were affected) when
one of the following forms of proximity was recorded: greater geographical proximity to
Ground Zero or the Pentagon (Galea et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001; Pew, 2002); a more
direct relationship, real or sensed, with the dead or the injured (Galea et al., 2002; Schuster195
et al., 2001); and greater number of television hours viewed on September 11 about the
attack (Schuster et al., 2001).
September 11 also created a persistent sensation of fear among a large part of the U.S.
population, alarmed by the possibility that there might be more attacks. This sensation was
accentuated by the anthrax letter scare. In this specific case in which feelings of fear and200
grief were activated, the anthrax letter attacks that occurred in many different parts of the
country in the weeks following 9/11 created such a tense atmosphere that some people no
longer dared to open their mail. The first anthrax-related deaths and, in particular, the media
coverage which reported many other suspected attacks contributed significantly to creating
this atmosphere that was tailor-made for the specific development of the phenomenon that205
some authors call “collective hysteria” but which others prefer to call “collective illusions”
(Stewart, 1984), highlighting that what emerges first is a perceived threat (for example, the
presence of anthrax), which triggers psychosomatic manifestations inside a network of peo-
ple in an atmosphere of increased vulnerability. It is possible that a collective phenomenon
of this type might occur among a minority sector of the population. At least, this is the claim210
of Bartholomew and Wessely (2002), who, in a study of just such a situation, reported that
this collective phenomenon, which they refer to as “mass sociogenic illness,” did occur in
certain sectors (they report that there were 2,300 false anthrax alarms during the first two
weeks of October 2001, many of which included “sociogenic symptoms”).
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Widespread sensations of fear and of feeling under threat alter the relationship between 215
the ingroup and outgroup. Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004) have shown that “higher
levels of fear lead people to perceive outgroups as more violent and potentially threatening,”
a perception that is associated “with increased ethnocentrism, punitiveness, and political
intolerance” (Marcus et al., 1995), features that are discussed below. Similarly, Coryn,
Beale, and Myers (2004) found a clear relationship between the outbreak of a conflict 220
that gives rise to anxiety—as was the case of 9/11—and prejudice towards those who are
perceived as its perpetrators.
Stage 3. Realization of Loss
The faith of the U.S. people in their country’s ability to protect them was called into question
in the aftermath of the attack on the greatest symbols of economic power and security. 225
Vulnerability and fear now more obviously present and the feeling of danger caused a
sector of the population to change their lifestyles, reducing many of their favorite activities
such as eating out, shopping, traveling, or going to places of entertainment (Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2002). A number of surveys supported these sweeping changes
in lifestyle; for example, 42% of the population said they spent more time near home and 230
family (in New York, the figure reached 57%); 25% reported opening their mail with greater
care; and 20% stopped traveling by air (Pew, 2002).
A large number of U.S. citizens expressed an awareness of the fact that their country
was vulnerable and acted accordingly, above all by reducing their activities away from home
and seeking refuge within the most intimate part of the ingroup. Among the effects that 235
derive from activation of the social identity are the activation of pro-social tendencies, of
cooperation and of feelings of solidarity towards the group, including also the motivation to
commit oneself to the group and to dedicate considerable amounts of effort and resources
to the group. The strength of this commitment can even lead on occasion to heroic actsQ6
of immolation on behalf of the group (Turner, 1987, 105). In the United States such acts 240
ranged from the strenuous efforts of the fire fighters and security forces to the substantial
response of citizens in terms of donating blood and offering their skills and money (Olson,
2002).
Stage 4. Suppression of Grief and the Seeking of Refuge in Values
In this stage a certain degree of self-control over the pain and fear is foreseen, fostered by a 245
strengthening of values that enables people to face up better to the challenges of daily life.
In order to cope with future threats and to avoid being overcome by the loss, in this phase
it is postulated that many people sought to suppress their grief. This reaction was favored by
widespread efforts to restore a sense of safety and national self-esteem and identity, and thus
to mitigate feelings of terror (Kliman & Llerena-Quinn, 2002). Similarly, it is postulated that 250
many citizens felt a need to recover their self-confidence and self-control. As usually occurs
in situations of conflict, according to social identity theory, a strong sense of social identity
emerged among the population, in this case as a nation that has been assaulted; the sense
of identification with the country was strengthened and made explicit. U.S. citizens sought
refuge in their most solid and readily available cultural values, fundamentally patriotism 255
and religion. Research shows how patriotic and nationalistic sentiments are intensified in
times of international conflict (Feshbach, 1987).
Social identity theory has examined this link between identity and ideology, demon-
strating that social identification with the group implies an identification with the beliefs and
ideology that it defends (Turner, 1982, 24). Thus, reactivating the values of the nation-group 260
contributes to a reestablishment of the most valuable content of social identity and, in this
way, to a re-establishment also of self-esteem and pride.
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The significance attached to the role of religion in U.S. life rose markedly after 9/11:
78% of the population reported it as being important in their lives, and 74% acknowledged
having prayed more after 9/11. These figures are unprecedented in the last forty years of265
Gallup polls; nonetheless, they were not accompanied by a greater acceptance of religious
minorities (Pew, 2001; AEI, 2002a).
Patriotic feeling increased notably, with similar conclusions being offered by various
polls. Some of the most thorough in this aspect (compiled in AEI, 2002a, 2002b) showed
that 87% of the population claimed to value their country more after 9/11, and 60% said270
that they had become more patriotic. Pride in being a U.S. citizen soared. Before 9/11, 55%
considered themselves “extremely proud” of their citizenship; after 9/11, this figure rose to
74%. This devotion to the country formed part of the sudden, widespread rise in the esteem
for what is ours: the things that characterize the culture, the people, and their identity .
Whereas before 9/11 the majority (62%) stated that they saw a division in the United States275
in terms of the values held to be most important, after the attacks a larger majority (74%)
considered the country to be united (AEI, 2002a, 2002b). Among the many manifestations
of patriotism after 9/11, flying the flag became a kind of fad. Though the flag was already
a highly significant symbol, it acquired new forms of expression and a new meaning. For a
majority of people, religion and patriotism appear to have provided solid values in which280
to seek refuge, being representative of their culture and linked to the identity of the U.S.
people and nation.
The proponents of “terror management theory” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg
et al., 1990; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) offer a complementary explanation
for this reactivation of the love of one’s own values—at least for those of religion and285
patriotism, for which the statistics point to just such a reactivation (an explanation that is
fully compatible with social identity theory). These authors forward the hypothesis that 9/11
reminded the U.S. people of their mortality (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003)
(attack on the ingroup); it intensified their reverence for all that was admirable in their
culture (a manifestation of ingroup favoritism); and it exacerbated their negative reactions290
toward those who were critical of their country (a manifestation of outgroup discrimination).
The proponents of terror management theory show that a realization of one’s own mortality
can: (1) increase ingroup affiliation and prejudices (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), (2) increase
hostility and aggression towards outgroup members (McGregor et al., 1998), (3) strengthen
ties with fellow ingroup members who conform to cultural expectations (Greenberg et al.,295
1990), and (4) increase nationalism (Arndt et al., 2002). These responses help to explain
the phenomena of anger and hostility which are analyzed in the next section.
Stage 5. Feelings of Anger
Fear and grief can be transformed into anger. According to Freyd (2002), this can occur both
individually and collectively. When feelings of fear are accentuated, anger can constitute300
a means of strengthening one’s sense of being in control. Anger and fear lead people to
draw clearer distinctions between the ingroup and the outgroup (Baron et al., 1992; Stephan
& Stephan, 1985). If the ingroup is seen as being strong, it is more likely that anger and
confrontation will be manifest as a means of responding to the conflict between groups
(Smith, 1993, 1999) and that more optimistic assessments will be made of future risks305
(Lerner et al., 2003). Anger and rage seek an outlet; they require that the situation be
defined so that the guilty party can be identified, and recognized and confronted as the
enemy. In this case the enemy, al-Qaeda, was promptly identified and the situation defined.
The outside enemy, the outgroup, was thus defined and the sentiments of anger and rage
felt by the members of the ingroup were channeled against them. The social identity of the310
ingroup that has been activated also implies the activation of animosity towards the outgroup
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aggressor. According to the theory of a group’s social identity (Turner, 1987), as individualsQ7
perceive themselves to be members of a group and to identify with it, their behavior is less
determined by personal interests; it undergoes a “depersonalization.” This depersonalization
also affects their way of perceiving the members of the outgroup, who are seen not as 315
individuals, but as elements of the same category, as homogenous, interchangeable beings
(the attribution of homogeneity to the outgroup).
The Arab identity of the attackers meant that the social categorization of the outgroup
was provisionally extended to include all citizens of Arab origin and the like, among whom
the enemy, the members of al-Qaeda, must lie. For Gerstenfeld (2002, 62), a nation’s social 320
identity takes on particular relevance in the context of an international conflict; in the case
of the United States, certain subjective definitions of the country’s social identity exclude
all descendants of non-Europeans (Perry, 2001), and the feeling of patriotism is associated
with feelings of prejudice and discrimination towards the outgroup (Kashti, 1996; Kelman,
1996). Ethnicity has a powerful, almost universal effect on social categorization (Fiske & 325
Neuberg, 1990). These reasons help explain why part of the anger was directed against
Arabs, the ethnic group from which al-Qaeda emerged. Indeed, the hostility spread, and all
people “of Middle Eastern appearance” were tarred with the same brush.
Various surveys showed that anger and mistrust toward persons from the Middle East
rose among the U.S. population. One year after 9/11, 54% believed that any new attack would 330
most likely be perpetrated by Islamic terrorists still living in the United States (Pew, 2002).
This helps elucidate how fearful groups can become hostile, how from feeling threatened
they become threatening themselves.
The anger felt by many U.S. citizens indeed manifest itself, in some cases, in hostility
toward people of Arabic or similar origin, with reports of gun or knife attacks, arson, attacks 335
on mosques, bomb threats and insults, in addition to the murder of a Sikh wearing a turban
who was mistaken for a Muslim. This was counterbalanced by many acts of kindness and
understanding: for instance, protecting mosques or accompanying Arab women and children
to markets and schools (Lee, 2002, 132–135).
Indeed, 9/11 changed the context of identification for thousands of U.S. citizens. This 340
was especially true of immigrants, and nowhere more so than among those from the Mid-
dle East, who were already associated in people’s minds with terrorism (Perry, 2001). For
instance, after the bomb attack in Oklahoma in 1995, the attention of the media and the secu-
rity forces turned immediately toward the Arab community, though eventually it transpired
that the perpetrators of the attack were U.S. citizens of European descent. 345
Stage 6. Desire for Justice and the Seeking of Revenge
As discussed above, social identification with a group implies identification with the beliefs
and ideology that it upholds. On studying the behavior of the masses, Reicher (1982, 73–74)
also stresses the importance of ideology and claims that it is the collective ideology that
will set the boundaries on the behavior to be taken in a given situation. And at the root of 350
all ideologies of protest, there lies the sense of injustice. This sense of injustice emerges
when the members of a group consider that they have not been treated as they deserve. If
this situation of injustice is attributed to impersonal causes (such as a economic crisis), the
reaction may be one of fear, resignation, or apathy, but if it is attributed to a specific group of
persons (in this case, al-Qaeda), the reaction will be one of anger, and this emotion generates 355
the energy that permits the aggrieved party to fight against those who have caused this sense
of injustice (Klandermans, 1997, 18). Thus, out of this sense of injustice, the anger and the
determination to fight to see that justice is done are born. Therefore, this sense of injustice
is also a source of ideological legitimacy for fighting against the aggression suffered. The
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importance of the role of the mass media in the social construction of this sense of injustice360
should be stressed, though it will not be analyzed any further here.
Angry and intimidated people are likely to believe that in order to get back to normal,
that is, to recover their sense of security, they need to eliminate the source of the damage
(Botcharova, 2001). The data on this do not point clearly to a desire to seek revenge or
to eliminate the enemy, but they do show a high degree of support for a broad military365
response. Surveys carried out after 9/11 (compiled in AEI, 2002a) indicated that around
90% of the U.S. population supported military action against the perpetrators of the attacks
(taking for granted that this would involve an intervention against another country). More
than 70% were willing to give up certain personal freedoms in order to reduce the threat
of terrorism and 55% were willing, for the same reason, to give up certain civil liberties as370
well (AEI, 2002a).
Stage 7. Telling and Retelling the “Right” Conflict History
When the sense of confrontation with another group is particularly acute, the strength of
ingroup identification also acquires greater intensity (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999, 92). This
suggests that the 9/11 attack activated, to a large extent, the social identity of U.S. citizens375
as a nation. Thus, the bipolar categorization between the ingroup and outgroup leads more
readily to the nurturing of this ingroup bias, in other words, to a situation in which people
tend to favor their own group (ingroup favoritism) and to discriminate against the outgroup
(outgroup discrimination) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). This bias can lead to extremes,
with the construction of an image of the ingroup as the incarnation of good and that of the380
outgroup as the incarnation of evil.
The U.S. government revived a discourse that was similar to that used during the Cold
War to legitimize their policies, but replacing the Communist threat with that of terrorism.
The politicians’ discourse and the predominant messages in the mass media meant that the
complexity of the international situation was largely reduced to a battle between “us,” the385
righteous, the human, and “them,” the evil and inhuman. This tendency is characteristic
of ideological systems when it becomes radicalized (Javaloy, 1993; Javaloy, Rodrı´guez
Carbailleira, & Espelt, 2001, 319–320, 338). The others have no right to a place in the human
community, and so inhuman treatment is justified (Kliman & Llerena-Quinn, 2002, 11).
This discourse promotes a simplistic, reductionist dichotomy which legitimizes the use of390
force. On September 19, 2001, the U.S. government announced “Operation Infinite Justice”
(renamed “Operation Enduring Freedom” six days later), and in January 2002 named the
countries that constituted the “Axis of Evil.” As Unger (2002, 48) suggests, the hidden
ideology or worldview that underpins the fanaticism or radical Islamic fundamentalism is
also present in the West—on a different scale, but of the same nature.395
The events of 9/11 created heroes and villains in keeping with the same bipolar vision
of the world. The media played a major part in this process. On the side of good, the
new heroes of the United States were the fire fighters, many of whom had died when the
towers collapsed, and the New York fire service worked fearlessly among the flames and
the wreckage. The fire fighters acquired mythical status in the public mind. Some people400
even crossed themselves in their presence; all kinds of fire service mementos were sold (also
becoming a kind of fad) and new fashion designs were made based on their uniforms. On the
side of evil, the following case serves to illustrate the reigning confusion and manipulation:
Reporting the reactions to 9/11 in the Arab world, the television station CNN showed
pictures of Palestinian children jumping for joy, pictures which were seen all over the world405
and were repeated time and again—until it was discovered that they had been filmed two
years earlier, and that the children had not been expressing their joy at the events of 9/11.
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But of course the message had already been transmitted that these children were the villains
in the piece.
An old myth of particular interest is the United States’ appropriation of the name of 410
the continent to refer to itself as “America.” The name is widespread today; it is used by
both U.S. citizens and foreigners. The emblematic sentence God bless America is a classic
example. Significantly also, 9/11 was named Attack on America.
September 11, however, was widely interpreted not only as an attack on the United
States, but as an attack on the western world in general. It is no less true that the threats 415
issued by Osama Bin Laden—who also had a vested interest in simplistic dichotomies
typical of fanatical thinking—contributed to this notion by declaring war between “Islam
and the infidels,” between the “Islamic nation” and the rest of the world.
Stage 8. An Act of “Justified” Aggression
According to the analysis undertaken up to this point, from the perspective of social identity 420
it is clear that the situation presented quite a number of the conditions whereby the attitudes
of the majority would favor an aggressive response to 9/11. In analyzing more thoroughly
this type of violent behavior, Opotow (1990) concluded that if the outgroup is considered
the incarnation of evil and its members are seen as homogenous beings, this tendency
can, in certain cases, lead to the infra-humanization of the enemy and behavior of extreme 425
violence. Likewise, Reicher (1982, 76) claims that seeing the others as being homogenized
by their social identity, and not on the basis of their personal characteristics, can lead to a
loss of morality and even to the use of torture and extreme cruelty. In this case, the enemy
was defined as the incarnation of evil (al-Qaeda), its components as terrorists (members of
al-Qaeda and its supporters), and as such greatly dehumanized. 430
The intervention in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that supported
and sheltered it was the aggressive response to 9/11. Those proposing an alternative based
on a constructive approach to conflict resolution, in line with what are known as models
of “interactive conflict resolution (ICR)” (Fisher, 1993, 1996), were in a clear minority.Q8
Below is a list of some other factors that may have persuaded many members of the U.S. 435
population to choose the destructive path, in support of their government:
• A possible hypothesis is that the great dimension of the 9/11 attack, both in real and in
symbolic terms, might have contributed to the fact that the dominant perspective that came
to be held was that of aggression, rather than conflict. Before 9/11 the conflict between
the United States and Islamic radicals had taken the form of sporadic terrorist attacks 440
on U.S. interests, but the attacks in New York and Washington could be interpreted as
such a clear vindication of the violent option that it drove the U.S. population to see the
conflict above all in unilateral terms of aggressors/victims and to situate the analysis in
the aftermath of a direct act of aggression.
• It is easier to explain the pressure to respond by using force from the perspective of 445
aggression. This perspective was further facilitated by the deeply ingrained cultural values
of defense and security, patriotism, the tradition as the world’s greatest power of military
intervention in foreign countries, and the opinion of the vast majority of the population
in support of an aggressive response.
• Consistent with these comments is the predominance of certain cognitive processes that 450
limited the ability to see the conflict from a broader perspective. Deutsch (1969) stresses
that the tension resulting from an escalation of conflict induces subjects to focus on the
immediate, shortening the time perspective, narrowing the range of perceived alternatives,
polarizing thought in simplistic black-and-white terms, inducing stereotyped responses,
and increasing the pressure toward social conformity. Weitzman and Kew (2002) note 455
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other biases in their study on 9/11, such as the “fundamental attribution error” (Jones &
Nisbett, 1971), which attributes the aggressive actions of the other to the other’s personal
characteristics, and “ethnocentricism,” which persuades us of our superior strength when
others attack us and to think that when we attack the other will collapse and divide
(Brewer, 1986). These biases affect the analysis of the phenomenon and may lead to460
mistaken or hurried decisions. However, in this case, this possible error of attribution
needs stronger empirical support.
Once the violent response had been taken, the perception of U.S. citizens of having
punished the aggressor should have spelt the end of the cycle of violence; however, a number
of factors might have impeded this, including the great impact of 9/11, the ongoing antiter-465
rorist operation, and the perception among the people of the possibility of new attacks—a
perception based on the warnings of their own government. In terms of social identity theory
and the eventual closing of the cycle, what is required is a gradual reduction in the activation
of U.S. social identity and of the phenomena that derived from this activation. A shift has
already begun in this direction. One year later, by way of example, since no cause–effect470
relations can be established, “many of the dramatic reactions of the public to the events of
9/11 had slowly faded” (Pew, 2002).
Discussion
This attempt at undertaking a global explanation of the collective reaction of the U.S. citizens
to the events of 9/11 has based its analysis on the positions adopted by a majority sector475
of this population. In speaking of the collective reaction of the citizens, it is understood
that this reaction emerged not from a direct knowledge of the events, but rather from the
perception of these events constructed through the mass media and, in particular, through
the definition of the situation transmitted by the authorities who did have direct knowledge
of what was actually occurring. The credibility afforded by the citizens to the different480
sources of information that were available contributed to shaping their eventual perception
of events.
The use of Botcharova’s (2001) eight-phase model enables a detailed, and at the same
time a fairly broad-ranging, study of the collective reactions to be undertaken. The phases
analyzed should not be seen as rigid and impermeable, but rather as presenting common485
elements that can and do occur simultaneously, since they are illustrative of a process that
unfolds in an interactive manner. The phases of this process describe the principal elements
of social behavior: affective, cognitive, cultural and of action, centered first on the ingroup
and then on the outgroup (Table 1). Thus, they describe a cycle that is set in motion and
brought to a conclusion, although the way in which the open conflict is terminated might490
have followed other phases that did not lead to revenge or punishment. If a review is made
of the eight phases, it can be seen that the coincidence of the citizen response appears most
likely in the first four, centered on the ingroup, and least likely in the last four, centered
on the outgroup, in particular in the last and definitive phase, that of violent response. The
model’s weaknesses might be identified as including its failure to consider the interaction of495
interpersonal relations and the existence of social networks, which are fundamental in the
transmission of collective phenomena; similarly, it fails to include the structural variables
that are so important in the analysis of phenomena of collective conflicts.
The application of social identity theory as a global framework for the analysis un-
dertaken here provides a highly coherent explanation of events and enables us to make500
some predictions concerning the future. In short, after 9/11, there first occurred the marked
salience of the aggrieved ingroup and the activation of mechanisms of ingroup favoritism.
The aggression from outside, together with the interpretation the citizens received of it by
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way of the authorities and the media, reminded the majority of U.S. citizens that they were
members of a group; it increased feelings of identification, self-esteem, solidarity and cohe- 505
sion; united their beliefs; enhanced cooperation; and strengthened their sense of belonging
and their commitment. Subsequently, outgroup discrimination came to the fore, activating
feelings of animosity towards the outgroup as if they formed a homogenous whole, which
was infra-humanized, seen as being the incarnation of evil and declared as the enemy that
must be defeated (Turner, 1987).Q9 510
The collective reaction initiated on 9/11 was characterized by a highly intense activation
of the emotions, including, as has been described: feelings of pain, grief, vulnerability,
fear, religious sentiments, feelings of patriotism, of anger, hostility, and revenge, among
others. The fact that this intensification of the emotions remained activated hindered part
of the population from undertaking a calm, cognitive processing of events, and led to a 515
number of limited reactions, not unlike those that Deutsch (1969) describes in similar
circumstances: a focus on the immediate situation restricting a broader time perspective
and a simplistic polarization (good–bad, security–insecurity, victors–humiliated) reducing
the range of alternatives and facilitating stereotypical responses.
The fight against the enemy was not concluded following the intervention in 520
Afghanistan, but rather was left open indefinitely. As the enemy has not been eliminated,
he could attack again. This suggests that, to a certain degree, the suspicion of future enemy
attacks maintains the social identity and the biases of favoritism and discrimination acti-
vated. Warnings of these threats can be used for political advantage. Specifically, Landau
et al. (2004) found that reminding experimental subjects about 9/11 increased the popular- 525
ity for President Bush, and an analysis of several time-series of polls conducted by Willer
(2004) “showed a consistent positive relationship between terror warnings and presidential
approval.” The maintenance of these alerts may contribute, as Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson
(2002, 79) note, to a rise in authoritarianism, as is often the case in times of uncertainty
and perceived threat. This in turn is accompanied by a deepening of mistrust toward im- 530
migrants, marking an abrupt about-turn in the distinctively favorable trend of previous
years.
In line with social identity theory, it might be predicted that attacks organized between
two groups—here, the United States and al-Qaeda—serve to intensify even further the social
identity of the parties to a conflict. This leads to greater bipolarization and an escalation in 535
the conflict. History also appears to show us that vengeance perpetuates trauma and deepens
the spiral of conflict. Although al-Qaeda is a small organization that cannot be compared
with the world’s leading power, its worldwide network and its potential for growth are
sufficient to keep this bipolarization alive. Thus, as long as the United States understands
that al-Qaeda has not been eliminated, the prognosis is that the fight will be prolonged 540
indefinitely.
A strategy recommended by social identity theory for resolving the conflict is to seek
a higher and wider categorization for the ingroup. What is required is to bring to the fore
an ingroup identity at a higher level (for example, the democratic countries of the world,
or the UN) so that the new, wider identity might bring about a change in the bipolarization 545
established. In the case of the United States such a strategy would mean seeing the situation
in terms of a new, more inclusive “us,” an alliance with the highest possible number of
countries, including above all those considered to be Islamic countries, so as to agree on the
best way of dominating al-Qaeda. Politically, this would have allowed the United States to
capitalize on the great international solidarity expressed after 9/11 and to construct a grand 550
alliance as the basis for achieving the maximum degree of consensus possible in order to
respond to the aggressors. In support of this strategy is the fact that al-Qaeda has carried
out terrorist attacks in various countries and has declared all countries not belonging to
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the “nation of Islam” as enemies. This alternative is only considered here theoretically, as
derived from social identity theory, without attempting to assess the practical difficulties555
that this option would have entailed.
In short, the perspective provided by social identity theory suggests that another re-
sponse was possible, another way in which to seek justice, the road of international agree-
ment in opposition to al-Qaeda, the construction of a large endogroup united behind this
cause. This could have involved many more countries than those that actually lent their sup-560
port. International cooperation of this nature would have contributed to changing the “U.S.
vs. al-Qaeda” bipolarization and would have achieved considerable world legitimacy. It is
reasonable to think that this alliance of coordinated countries would have enjoyed greater
success in the fight against al-Qaeda and would have contributed to a greater perception of
peace and security in the world.565
The United States would have exercised a leadership based more closely on cooperation
than imposition. It is reasonable to think that the United States would have earned prestige
in international public opinion. However, it is more difficult to hypothesize the extent to
which the U.S. population would have allowed its government to slow down the process
while it sought the wider consensus and international involvement in its response. Some570
sectors would have supported this path, however the emotional intensification described
above placed pressure on the government to take a rapid response.
However, if the United States maintains its unilateral struggle against al-Qaeda, even
though it receives support from some countries, it might lose international legitimacy,
above all if it carries out indiscriminate attacks or if these are interpreted as anti-Islamic,575
or if it commits acts that are questionable on legal and humanitarian grounds, such as the
holding of prisoners at Guantanamo. If this does occur, the social identity of al-Qaeda
might gain greater saliency among the sympathizers of fundamental Islam and attract other
“anti-imperialist,” radical activists.
Before concluding, it is important to mention certain possible limitations in this study580
in relation to the data presented, since some are drawn from opinion polls in which the
methodological controls are not always entirely rigorous. With the care that these and other
limitations dictate, it is fair to claim that the analysis undertaken here of the collective
reaction of U.S. citizens following the events of 9/11, based on the focus provided by social
identity theory, offers a consistent explanation of the events. Nevertheless, the events of585
9/11 should continue to be studied from other perspectives so that we might further our
understanding of such an important episode.
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